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If Sandel made a showing, he would be given better men to fight,
with bigger purses to win; so it was to be depended upon that he
would put up a fierce battle. He had everything to win by it -
money and glory and career; and Tom King was the grizzled old
chopping block that guarded the highway to fame and fortune.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional boxing is undoubtedly a contentious sport.2 Primarily,
this is because the object of each bout is to inflict physical injury on the
other party,3 and clearly outside of the ring such an activity would be
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1. Jack London, A Piece of Steak, in SPORTING BLOOD 23 (Howard Lachtman ed., 1981).
Lachtman describes London as "the first to stake a claim on the sports world as a legitimate
and worthwhile subject for writing." Id. at xi.
2. Recent problems have centered around fatalities and injuries within the sport such as
those suffered by Gerald McClellan. Nobody Urged Me to Halt the Fight, Says French Referee,
THm GUARDIAN, Mar. 1, 1995, at 21; Bob Mee, Fighting the Demons, Tim INDEPENDENT, July
16, 1995, at 10. "How many more boxers have got to run the risk of permanent disability in
Britain before we take the serious step of considering the banning of this sport?" Sally Weale,
World Boxing Title Loser Urged to Quit Ring, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 1994 (quoting Men-
zies Campbell, Liberal Democrat spokesman on sport). The role women are allowed to play
within the sport is also an ongoing issue that is unlikely to be easily resolved. Barbara Lewis,
Gloves Come Off in Battle Over Women's Boxing, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 28,1993, at
7. For an analysis of the legal position of prize fighting see Neil Parpworth, Boxing and Prize
Fighting: the Indistinguishable Distinguished, 2 J. SPORT & L. 1. On legal issues that pervade
boxing, see generally Michael Gunn & David Ormerod, The Legality of Boxing, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 181 (1995).
3. With regard to amateur boxing the ABA notes: "Boxing is a contact sport in which
points are scored by landing blows with force on the opponent. Inevitably, there is a risk of
injury to those who box." THE MEDICAL COMM'N OF THE AMATEUR BOXING ASS'N, THE
MEDICAL ASPECTs OF AMATEUR BOXING 1 (2d ed. 1989).
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unlawful and could attract both civil and criminal sanctions.4 In addition
to the potential risk of death or serious injury, the sport has had more
than its fair share of controversial characters and incidents.5 The most
recent example of this has been the release from the Indiana Youth
Center on March 25, 1995 of former heavyweight champion Mike Ty-
67son, an occurrence that has sent the sports media into overdrive.7
While it is often the medical aspects of boxing that fall to academic
scrutiny8 or grab the headlines,9 often overlooked are the relationships
that exist between the fighters, their managers, and promoters and the
mechanism that often binds them-the standard form contracts that ex-
ist in British professional boxing. Our analysis focuses upon two promi-
nent court cases that have challenged the legality of the standard form
agreement, 10 the problems that have been caused by alleged promoters'
cartels," and recent developments in English boxing that have at-
tempted to safeguard the economic interests of British boxers.
4. See Gunn & Ormerod, supra note 2. On consent in physical contact sport, see generally
Criminal Law: Consent and Offences Against the Person (1994) (Law Commission Consulta-
tion Paper No. 134). On consent as it applies to association football see Simon Gardiner &
Alexandria Felix, Juridification of the Football Field: Strategies for Giving Law the Elbow, 5
MARO. SPoRTS L. J. 189, 201-04, 206-07, 210 (1995).
5. See, e.g., G. SUSTER, CHAMPIONS OF THE RING (1994); NORMAN MAILER, THE FIGHT
(1975).
6. Tyson was released on parole after serving three years of his six year sentence for rape.
One of the undoubted attractions of Tyson to the boxing fraternity is that he was the last
heavyweight to unify the division and hold all titles concurrently.
7. See, e.g., Kevin Mitchell, The King with All the Aces, THE OBSERVER, Apr. 2, 1995, at
14; Ed Vulliamy, 'Mad Mike' is Free... Praise be to Allah!, THE OBSERVER, Mar. 26, 1995, at
1.
8. Gunn & Ormerod, supra note 2; Parpworth, supra note 2.
9. The build up to the Frank Bruno and Oliver McCall heavyweight contest was marred
by the pre-fight hype in which McCall made reference to seeking "vengeance" for Gerald
McClellan, the American middleweight boxer who suffered serious head injuries in his fight
with Nigel Benn earlier in the year. See Jack Massarik, McCall Faces Big Fine, THE GUARD-
IAN, Aug. 3, 1995, at 19.
10. Warren v. Mendy, 3 All E.R. 103 (1989); Watson v. Prager, 1993 E.M.L.R. 275.
11. In Watson it was revealed that the major four promoters in England had an arrange-
ment whereby the income from promotions was pooled and then divided. 1993 E.M.L.R. at
286, 290-91. This clearly creates issues in respect of both competition law and common law




II. Tim HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF BOXING 12
In 1867, the Amateur Athletics Club asked the eighth Marquis of
Queensbury to give his name to new rules for the outdoor boxing con-
tests that they ran. In effect the Queensbury Rules were the first at-
tempts to regulate boxing contests by advocating the use of boxing
gloves, fixed rounds of three minutes with a minute's rest in between,
and the adoption of a referee to adjudicate upon proceedings.
The Amateur Boxing Association (ABA) was set up in 1880 by a
group of leading members of amateur clubs and developed into a Lim-
ited Company in 1993.13 "Their championships were immediately popu-
lar and the ABA's influence spread quickly-Dublin BC affiliated in
1884 and Cardiff three years later. They were models of decorum."' 4
The major objective of the ABA is to "promote the sport and practice of
amateur boxing in England."' 5 One key element relates to the training
and education of boxing coaches, though the more public face is the run-
ning of the national championships. In order to ensure a close degree of
regulation, a number of regional associations administer the boxing clubs
within the different areas they cover. In addition to the English Associa-
tion, there are similar bodies in Scotland, Ireland, and Wales in addition
to both a European and International Association.
While at the time the professional sport of boxing was largely unreg-
ulated, it has been administered by the British Boxing Board of Control
(BBBC or "Board") since 1929.16 The BBBC licenses boxers, trainers,
promoters, and managers nationally while other day to day administra-
tion is divided into eight Area Councils. Crucially, the BBBC licenses
not just the participants but the contests themselves. A promoter must
lodge details of any promotion at least six days before the mooted pro-
12. On boxing within the wider context of the development of sport, see SIR DRElaK
BIRLEY, SPORT AND THE MAKING OF BRITAIN (1993); SIR DEREK BIRLEY, LAND OF SPORT
AND GLORY (1995).
13. JAMES W. KENYON, BOXING HISTORY (1961).
14. BIRLEY, SPORT AND THE MAKING OF BRITAIN 287 (1993).
15. Memorandum of Association Clause 3, Amateur Boxing Association of England Ltd.
(on file with author).
16. Watson, 1993 E.M.L.R. at 281. Every time a professional boxer suffers death or seri-
ous injury in the ring there are renewed calls for the abolition of the sport. See Weale, supra
note 2. The administrators of Amateur Boxing attempt to draw a distinction between the two
wings of the sport: "It is unfortunate that many who might be included in the 'anti-boxing'
scenario do not know, or in fact, understand or appreciate that there is a very wide gulf be-
tween Amateur Boxing, the SPORT which I am discussing herein and the BUSINESS of Pro-
fessional Boxing." A.A. Pontremoli, Amateur Boxing: Is It Dangerous? (1995) (Amateur
Boxing Association booklet, on file with author).
1995]
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motion and the Board has the power to prohibit any contest which it
considers is not "in the interests of boxing. '17 The Board may rule out
contests that appear to be mismatches, particularly with overseas boxers
whose records are not always as authentic as they ought to be.'" The
Board will also liaise closely with promoters "behind the scenes" in an
attempt to minimize the likelihood of mismatches occurring.
The Board has a crucial supervisory medical role for the sport. It
first established a medical committee in 1950, and in many ways this is
now its primary function. Each Area Council has a medical officer who
recommends whether or not the BBBC should grant or renew a boxer's
license.19 Every tournament will have two medical officers assigned to it
who will certify that the boxers are fit to take part. A doctor will also sit
at ringside throughout the bout. The Board also employs inspectors who
are responsible for ensuring that all contests are carried out within the
regulations.
Amateur boxing may well act as the springboard for a professional
career:
The Board expects that all applicants have had experience in am-
ateur boxing. Amateur records are usually checked and anybody
contemplating a professional career who has not already boxed is
advised to contact an amateur club in his area. For anyone striv-
ing to get to the very top of the professional sport it is almost
impossible without first having had a good amateur career.20
Without a strong amateur boxing background, the applicant will be
required to spend time under the supervision of a professional trainer
17. The Role of the BBBC in Professional Boxing in This Country (BBBC documentary
information, on file with author). Documentary information provided to the authors courtesy
of the BBBC.
18. The issue of mismatches is an important one, as the risk of injury clearly increases
when one boxer is less able than the other. The return of Tyson indicates the nature of the
problem; he obviously needs some ring practice but does not want to meet an opponent likely
to beat him in the first instance. Consequently he was scheduled to fight Peter McNeeley, a
heavyweight with a previously undistinguished record. McNeeley was given a top ten ranking
by the World Boxing Council while Tyson's rating has remarkably risen to number one. Pat
Putnam, Great White Dope Sacrificed to Tyson Follows Family Tradition, THE OBSERVER, May
28, 1995, at 6. For a cynical analysis of the career of Peter McNeeley, see Pat Putnam, Tyson's
Fattened Bull, THE OBSERVER, Aug. 6, 1995, at 9. In the end the critics were proved right with
the fight lasting a mere 89 seconds.
19. Recently 33 South African boxers lost their licenses when it was revealed that they
had tested positive for the HIV virus. Jack Massarik, Ban on 33 Boxers After Aids Tests, THE
GUARDIAN, July 18, 1995.
20. Letter from British Board of Boxing Control Ltd. on A Career as a Professional
Boxer (on file with author) [hereinafter BBBC Letter].
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and demonstrate his skills in a trial bout.' The "licensed boxer" is re-
quired to enter into a standard boxer/manager agreement with a man-
ager who is also licensed by the Board.22 The boxer is obliged to enter
into this agreement; otherwise, he will not be licensed and therefore un-
able to box. 23
While the potential financial rewards for professional fighters are
high, the high earning boxers are few in number and the profession faces
competition from elsewhere:
But while the top handful of fighters earn fortunes, there are signs
that in Britain at least, boxing may be dying a slow death, that it
resembles a pyramid with a glittering top and crumbling founda-
tions. There are now 12,000 amateurs, but 15 years ago there were
50,000; and there are now 700 professionals compared to 1,000
then. The British Boxing Board of Control admits poor kids are
increasingly turning to athletics and football as a way out of no-
where and the martial arts as a means of discipline.24
Even the BBBC acknowledges that very few boxers will be able to
concentrate solely on boxing and will need a secondary career to fall
back upon.25 At the same time, however, it is undeniable that there are
large sums of money to be made by the elite international few:
21. Id.
22. The Board requires that the following items must be completed at this point:
1. Application form properly signed and witnessed.
2. Payment of license fee deposit.
3. Complete medical examination on standard form by a Board doctor, together with
confirmation of identity.
4. Complete ophthalmic (sic) examination by qualified optician on standard form to-
gether with confirmation of identity.
5. Cr (brain) scanning including skull x-ray report and confirmation of identity.
6. Certificate of HIV Testing.
7. Hepatitis B vaccination.
8. Lodging of standard Boxer/Manager Agreements with application.
9. Lodging of birth certificate with application.
Id.
23. While there does not appear to be any reported case on the refusal to issue a license, it
is possible given the case of Nagle v Fielden, 2 W.L.R. 1027 (1966) (concerning the refusal of
the Jockey club to issue a training license) that the courts would be prepared to consider the
case. See Neil Parpworth, Judicial Review and Sports Bodies, in MANCHESTER METROPOLI-
TAN UNIVERSITY WORKING PAPERS IN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (Series 1, No. 3).
24. Alex Spillius, For a Fistful of Dollars, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 1994, at 4.
25. "[I]t must be realised from the outset that very few boxers make it to the very top.
For most boxers their ring earnings will act as a boost to their ordinary earnings and all poten-
tial boxers are therefore advised to ensure they have a good regular income which they can
maintain during their boxing career." BBBC Letter, supra note 20.
1995]
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[T]hree years out of the ring have done for Tyson's box office
appeal what no string of unbroken victories could ever have.
Each week brings more dizzying estimates of what his comeback
fight might earn. Upwards of $120 million if it is against Riddick
Bowe,... as much as $150 million... if he takes on George
Foreman.26
Whether the boxer ends up earning a fortune or not, to be eligible to
box and to have a chance of making it to the top the boxer is required to
enter into a management contract before the BBBC will license the
boxer. The contract is a standard form one, and as with the operation of
standard form contracts in other areas of the entertainment industry, the
use of then has been subject to judicial scrutiny in recent years.27 The
standard boxing agreement was first challenged in the U.K. in Warren v.
Mendy.28
Standard form contracts are widely used in many business contexts;2 9
however, as our analysis will show:
[I]t is arguable that standard terms are inappropriate to "transac-
tions" where the commodity is individual creativity rather than
goods. Therefore, an artist may make a commitment which will tie
them for the whole of their creative career in circumstances
where they have very little bargaining "leverage" and any con-
tract they are offered is on a "take it or leave it" basis.3°
While it is arguable that boxers may not be creative in the same way that
musicians and actors are, their careers share certain similarities,31 and as
26. Ian Katz, From Hard Cell to Hard Sell, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 24, 1995, at 2. The
current British boxers who are attracting heavy media coverage include Lennox Lewis,
"Prince" Naseem, and Chris Eubank.
27. On the entertainment industry, see generally Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn, Sym-
pathy for the Devil? Contractual Constraint and Artistic Autonomy in the Entertainment Indus-
try, 15 J. MEDIA L. & PRAc. 117 (1994).
28. 3 All E.R. 103 (1989).
29. On the history of standard form contracts, see, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF CONTRACT 16 (5th ed. 1995); G.H. TRErrEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 196-260
(1995). See also Lord Diplock's comments in Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulay, 3
All E.R. 616, 623-24 (1974) (music publishing contract) on the characteristics of such
contracts.
30. Andrew Boon et al., In Fear of Rocking the Boat: The Bargaining Culture of Commer-
cial Music Contracts, in MANCHESTER METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY WORKING PAPERS IN LAW
AND POPULAR CULTURE (Series 1, No. 2).
31. Certainly the courts have seen similarities such as the role of managers and promoters
in various fields and have applied the restraint of trade doctrine to these perhaps seemingly
discreet areas. See Greenfield & Osborn, supra note 27.
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with other professional sports personnel, the career duration is con-
stantly threatened by injury.32
III. ROUND 1: WARREN V. MAPNDY
Nigel Benn was a very promising young amateur boxer.33 In 1986 he
won the ABA middleweight championship and subsequently decided to
turn professional2 4 Shortly after his first professional contest he signed
a three year management agreement with Burt McCarthy, and his first
twelve professional fights were promoted by Frank Warren, who held
BBBC licenses as both a manager and promoter.3 5 Benn had a brilliant
start to his professional career winning his first eighteen fights by knock-
outs or technical knockouts.36
In January 1988, it was agreed that Warren would act as Benn's man-
ager in place of McCarthy, and Benn and Warren entered into a stan-
dard boxer/manager agreement for a three year period .3  Benn fought
six more contests under Warren's management and promotion before he
became disillusioned with the relationship.38 As a consequence of his
disillusionment, he asked Ambrose Mendy to advise him on all matters
regarding his career. 9 Unlike Warren, Mendy was not licensed to be a
manager by the BBBC and described himself as a "trade development
counsellor. '40 Faced with this situation, Warren sought injunctions
against Mendy which prevented him from:
(i) inducing, procuring, assisting or facilitating the breach by
Nigel Benn of his contract with the plaintiff;
(ii) otherwise acting as Nigel Benn's manager or agent in rela-
tion to any boxing contest, match, exhibition and any other pro-
fessional engagements ancillary to his career as a professional
boxer;
(iii) holding himself out as Nigel Benn's manager or agent in con-
nection with any boxing contest, match, exhibition or any other
engagement ancillary to Nigel Benn's career.41
32. On Association Football, see Gardiner & Felix, supra note 4.
33. Benn has been described as being "a very talented boxer with prospects of a highly
remunerative career." Warren, 3 All E.R. at 106.
34. Id. at 106.
35. 1&
36. Benn's career record was 41 contests, won 38, drawn 1, and lost 2. See BRmsH Box-
ING BOARD OF CONTROL YEARBOOK (1995).
37. Warren, 3 All E.R. at 106.
38. Id. at 106-07.
39. Id. at 107.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 105.
1995]
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At first instance injunctions were duly granted,4' but these were
lifted on application by Mendy. Warren duly appealed to the Court of
Appeal to have the injunctions reinstated.43 The major difficulty facing
the plaintiff was the effect that the injunctions would have on Benn.
While the BBBC permits boxers to manage themselves, it was accepted
that boxers in that position might still be in need of commercial advice.
Such advice could be within the ambit of the Boxer/Manager Agreement
Article 4, which provided:
The boxer agrees and undertakes: (i) during the continuance of
this Agreement to be managed and directed exclusively by the
Manager and not to enter into any agreement or arrangements
with any other Manager or person for any of the above men-
tioned purposes without obtaining the prior written consent of
the manager.
Clearly the agreement is an exclusive one, though the crucial feature is
to determine the coverage of the agreement. By virtue of Article 2 of
the contract the manager was obliged to arrange a program of both box-
ing4 and other professional activities.45 By involving Mendy in his box-
ing life, Benn was clearly breaching the agreement, and this would also
be the case with allied commercial activities.
This case was a little unusual in that the injunction was not being
sought against one of the two contractual parties but rather a third party
who was "interfering" with the contractual relationship. 46 It is a long
established principle that courts will not grant an order for specific per-
42. See id. at 107. An ex parte injunction was obtained by Warren on July 20, 1988 by Mr.
Justice Roch. This order was discharged by the High Court on September 12, 1988 by Mr.
Justice Pill.
43. For a discussion of court hierarchy and civil appellate procedure, see PHIL HARRIS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW 134-138 (1993). See also P.F. SmrrH & S.H. BAILEY, THE MOD-
ERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (1993).
44. Warren, 3 All E.R. at 107. It is interesting to examine Benn's fight earnings. His final
Warren Promoted fight, which was postponed because of the litigation, carried a disputed
purse for Benn of either £7,500 (Benn) or £10,000 (Warren). His previous two purses had
been £7,500 and £5,000, prior to this no purse had exceeded £3,000.
45. Frank Bruno's out of ring activities have included appearing in television game shows,
product advertisements (HP sauce), and pantomime.
46. The area where injunctions are most commonly sought against third parties are trade
dispute cases, where employers seek injunctions against trade unions to prohibit any induce-
ment to breach the employment contracts of the work force. See JOHN BoWERs & MICHAEL




formance of a contract for personal services.47 They have, however, per-
mitted negative stipulations which have tended to uphold the original
agreement even though such a positive order is impermissible.4s
Theoretically, a negative order which enforces a positive obligation is
beyond the court's jurisdiction; however, the earlier cases tend to
demonstrate an increased willingness to support contractual obligations
through injunctions despite the consequences. A prime illustration of
this view can be found in the decision in Warner Brothers, which con-
cerned the exclusive contract of the actress Bette Davis:49
On a first consideration that judge's view that Miss Bette Davis
might employ herself both usefully and remuneratively in other
spheres of activity for a period of up to three years appears to
have been extraordinarily unrealistic. It could hardly have been
thought to be a real possibility that an actress of her then youth
and soaring talent would be able to forgo screen and stage for
such a period.50
The Warren court argued that there was a marked difference between a
short and a long term engagement and that should the contract last for
two years or more it was far more likely that an injunction would compel
performance of the contract.5' The whole question of compelling per-
formance lies at the heart of the judgment, and the court was conscious
that although the injunction was sought against a third party, it would
have the effect of forcing Benn to either manage himself or return to
Warren for the duration of the agreement. Any new manager who Benn
approached would run the risk of Warren launching a similar action:
In such a case the court ought not to enforce the performance of
the negative obligations if their enforcement will effectively com-
pel the servant to perform his positive obligations under the con-
tract. Compulsion is a question to be decided on the facts of each
case, with a realistic regard for the probable reaction of an injunc-
tion on the psychological and material, and sometimes the physi-
cal, need of the servant to maintain skill or talent. The longer the
47. See Rigby v. Connol, 14 Ch. D. 482, 487 (1880); Francis v. Municipal Councillors of
Kuala Lumpur, 3 All E.R. 633 (1962). See also M.P. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE, FiFoor & Fums-
STON'S LAw OF CoTR'r'cr 631-35 (12th ed. 1991).
48. See Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G.M. & G. 604 (1852); Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v.
Nelson, 1 K.B. 207 (1936) (the Bette Davis case). For a more recent case, see Evening Stan-
dard Co. v. Henderson, 1987 I.C.R. 588.
49. For the background to the Bette Davis case, see generally SEvE GREENFMLD & Guy
OSBORN, CONTRACrUAL CONTROL IN THE ENTERTAiNmENT INDUSTRY (forthcoming 1996);
BARBARA LEAMNG, BETTE DAvis (1992); CHARLS HIGMAN, BETrE (1981).
50. Warren, 3 All E.R. at 112.
51. Id.
1995]
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term for which an injunction is sought, the more readily will com-
pulsion be inferred. Compulsion may be inferred where the in-
junction is sought not against the servant but against a third party,
if either the third party is the only other available master or if it is
likely that the master will seek relief against anyone who attempts
to replace him. 2
A crucial factor in Benn's favor was the short duration of a profes-
sional boxing career and also the necessity for a close and trusting rela-
tionship with his manager. 3 Accordingly, the court was not prepared to
grant the injunctions sought.
Having refused the claim, the court went on to consider the problem
caused by a manager who also acted as a promoter. When a boxer's
manager is also promoting the contest, he is in the dubious position of
signing the standard promoter/boxer agreement twice: once as the pro-
moter and secondly on behalf of the boxer. Commenting on the dual
relationship, the Court noted:
It may be that there are many cases in which it works to the
boxer's advantage. But the emergence of one where it may well
have worked to his disadvantage is something which we would
respectfully think ought to cause the board concern. They may
well wish to consider whether the regulations ought to be revised
in such a way that the relationship can, if it is thought to be desir-
able, continue to exist, but only with stringent safeguards to pro-
tect the boxer. 4
The possible conflict of interest had long troubled the boxing authori-
ties. In the 1950s dual licensing as manager and promoter was not per-
missible; however, the enactment of an entertainment tax to boxing
promotions had serious financial implications and led to the Board alter-
ing its rules to allow managers to promote and vice versa.' This was not
universally viewed as progressive, and the position was altered at the
Annual General Meeting in 1984 to prevent the dual position.56 This
reversal was very unpopular with some managers who argued that unless
they were able to promote their young boxers, there would not be any
52. Id. at 114.
53. This was also at issue in the case of Page One Records Ltd. v. Britton, 1 W.L.R. 157
(1968), which involved the Troggs pop group and a dispute with their personal management.
On the enforceability of music contracts, see Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn, Unchained
Melody: Restraint of Trade and Music Contracts, Bus. L. REv., Oct. 1992, at 223.
54. Warren, 3 All E.R. at 117.




opportunities for them to box.57 Accordingly, this policy was reversed
by a Special General Meeting later in the year.5 8 Following the decision
in Warren, the Board again reconsidered the position and allowed man-
agers to promote all contests except those involving their own fighters.5 9
This again brought protests fron. managers outside of London, but also
significantly from the Office of Fair Trading.60
The Office of Fair Trading is given jurisdiction under the Restrictive
Trade Practices Act 1976 to refer agreements that act to restrict competi-
tion to the Restrictive Practices Court. Any agreement that falls within
the wide ambit of "registerable agreements" must be sent to the OFT for
registration within three months of making the agreement. Once the
agreement is registered, the Director General6' will normally refer the
matter to the Restrictive Practices Court for a ruling on whether the
restrictions within the agreement are contrary to the public interest. The
Office of Fair Trading considered that the restriction of a manager or
promoter to one role or the other would have a significantly adverse
affect on competition and would therefore require registration and be
subject to a referral to the court to determine whether it was in the pub-
lic interest. Their letter to a leading promoter's solicitors of January 17,
1990 spelled out the basis of the position:
In inviting the Board to reconsider the proposed changes (so as to
avoid a possible reference to the Restrictive Practices Court on
the points) we said that we saw no reason to prevent managers
promoting boxers whom they did not manage; nor why some sys-
tem could not operate to represent a boxer's interests particu-
larly, for example, in situations where the manager could find no
promoter willing to stage a contest for a particular boxer and
hence had no option but to promote the contest himself.62
This view rather overlooks the fact that the court of appeals had ex-
pressed grave reservations about dual licensing and that the objection to
the change, within the BBBC, had arisen from regional promoters who
57. Id. at 284.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 285.
60. Id. at 285-86. "The OFT is similar in many respects to the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) in the USA in that both bodies have open-ended remits to oversee competition and
consumer interests. Unlike the FTC, however, the OFT has no quasi-judicial function, being a
purely administrative agency." TIM FRAZER, MONOPOLY, CoMPwrrroN AND THE LAW 33-34
(2d ed. 1992). This book provides a useful outline of U.K. Competition Law.
61. FRAZER, supra note 60, at 33. The Director General of Fair Trading is an office set up
under the Fair Trading Act 1973 to oversee U.K. competition.
62. Watson, 1993 E.M.L.R at 286 (quoting letter to Micky Duff's solicitors).
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argued that management and promotion was a necessity. Subsequent to
the Office of Fair Trading's intervention, the BBBC re-amended its regu-
lations to permit dual licensing.63 This was not the end of the issue,
which returned to haunt the boxing authorities in Watson.
IV. ROUND 2: WATSON v. PRAGER
Michael Watson had been a very promising amateur boxer 64 who an-
ticipated being selected for the 1984 Olympics; he signed an agreement
in March 1984 to turn professional after the Olympics with Mickey Duff,
a well known figure in the boxing world, as his manager.65 Watson was
not selected for the Olympic team, however, and turned professional in
September 1984.66 The original management agreement was scheduled
to run for a three year period.67 An additional three year extension to
the agreement was signed in April 1987.68 While this second agreement
still had nine months to run, Duff exercised his option under the contract
to extend the period for an additional three years.69 This option became
exercisable when Watson won a British, European, Commonwealth, or
World championship. Accordingly, the contract was due to expire on
March 31, 1993.70 The highlight of this second contract period was Wat-
son's fight against the previous subject of boxing litigation, Nigel Benn.71
Watson's winning of the Commonwealth Middleweight Championship
triggered the extension option.
After his defeat in his challenge for the World Boxing Association's
Middleweight title against Mike McCallum, Watson sought to terminate
63. Id. at 286.
64. Id. at 288.
65. Id. Interestingly enough, it was revealed in evidence that Watson was to receive
£100.00 per week for training and living expenses despite the fact that he was still an amateur.
The judge commented: "I have a strong suspicion that the amateur boxing authorities would
have regarded this agreement with some disfavour." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. During the first agreement Watson fought 13 times. For the first six fights his
purse was £500.00 per fight; for fights 7 to 11, £600.00 to £850.00 per fight; and for fights 12
and 13, £1000.00 each. All 13 fights were promoted by Micky Duff or his company National
Promotions. I&
68. Id. at 289. During the course of the second agreement Watson fought 12 more con-
tests for which he received the following purses: fight number 14: £800.00, 15: £1200.00, 16:
£5000.00, 17: £3500.00, 18 and 19: £5000.00, 20: £9000.00,21: £3000.00,22 and 23: £6000.00,24:
£100,000.00, 25: £87,000.00. All fights excepts numbers 20, 24, and 25 were also promoted by
Micky Duff. Id.
69. Id. at 278.
70. Id.
71. See Warren v. Mendy, 3 All E.R. 103 (1989).
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the management agreement.7 2 The basis of Watson's claim was that the
boxer/manager agreement that he signed with Mickey Duff amounted to
an unreasonable restraint of trade73 and was therefore unenforceable.74
At the same time, Watson sought damages from the defendant and his
company.75 The doctrine of restraint of trade has long since expanded
from its narrow boundaries of employer/employee relationships and the
sale of businesses and has been a virulent force, particularly with respect
to entertainment and sports contracts.76 The first task of the court is to
determine whether the contract under scrutiny is subject to the doctrine;
contracts that regulate normal commercial relations are not considered
to be challengeable. 77  Clearly this was the "normal" boxer/manager
contract; in fact there could be no other agreement as BBBC regulations
provided that in order to have a license, the standard form agreement
was the only one permissible.7 s The fact that the manager did not deter-
mine the term did not convince the court that it was prevented from
examining the agreement:
Undue restraint of trade offends against public policy and it is the
Courts that are the guardians of public policy. The restrictions im-
posed on a boxer by a boxer-manager contract are in reality de-
cided upon by the Board, albeit that their contractual
enforcement must rest with the manager. The Board evidently re-
gards the restrictions as in the interests of professional boxing, as
well as in the interests of the parties, but it is not, in my judge-
ment, satisfactory that an entity such as the Board, which controls
all aspects of professional boxing should be regarded as free from
judicial supervision in so far as its rules and regulations impose
commercial restrictions on participators in the sport.79
Despite the fact that this arrangement could well be considered "normal
contractual relations," the court argued strongly that when a body that
72. Watson, 1993 E.M.L.R. at 289.
73. The doctrine of restraint of trade has a long historical lineage. Professor A.G. Guest
describes the domain of the doctrine thus: "An agreement in restraint of trade has been de-
fined as 'one in which a party (the covenantor) agrees with any other party (the covenantee)
to restrict his liberty in the future to carry on trade with other persons not parties to the
contract in such a manner as he chooses'." A.G. Gunsr, ANsON's LAW OF CoNTRAcr 318
(26th ed. 1986). Guest goes on to provide a useful history of the development and scope of
the doctrine. On its application to music contracts, see Greenfield & Osborn, supra note 53.
74. Watson, 1993 E.M.L.R. at 278.
75. Id. at 279.
76. For a general analysis of this area, see Greenfield & Osborn, supra note 27.
77. Esso Petroleum Co. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport), Ltd., 1968 App. Cas. 269.
78. Watson, 1993 E.M.L.R. at 290.
79. Id. at 297.
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runs professional sport effectively determines the ability of participants
to practice that sport, the doctrine of restraint of trade will apply and
"rules or regulations must be franked by passing through the reasonable-
ness gateway."80
Having satisfied itself as to its jurisdiction,8 ' the court went on to
argue that the manager/promoter was even more vulnerable to the appli-
cation of the doctrine given the potential conflict of interest created by
promoting a managed boxer. The court referred to an agreement which
permits contemporaneous promotion and management as "a very
strange animal indeed. '82 The position of the court was thus to deter-
mine whether the restrictions were reasonable and therefore justifiable.
In favor of the restrictions was the fact that they were initiated by the
BBBC for the protection of boxers.83 At the start of their career, boxers
may well be young and inexperienced in relation to both the organiza-
tion of professional boxing and business matters generally!' Accord-
ingly, the BBBC attempts to ensure a system of regulation to prevent
undue exploitation and support the physical safety of boxers.85
The duration of the initial three years was found to be a reasonable
period enabling proper career development; however, the judge ex-
pressed reservations about the extension option if the fighter won a
championship bout. 6 The court suggested that an extension period of
eighteen months would provide the manager with sufficient reward for
his earlier endeavors. 87 Theoretically, the boxer's first contest under his
manager could be the championship fight which would permit a further
80. Id. at 298.
81. Id. at 299.
82. Id. at 299.
83. Id.
84. It is interesting to compare the position of young musicians at this point. In Silvertone
Records v. Mountfield, 1993 E.M.L.R. 152 (concerning Manchester band The Stone Roses),
the court observed that "[t]he Stone Roses themselves were not highly educated, had no legal
experience, little or no business experience and were very much under the experience of Mr
Evans (the band's manager)."
85. Judge Scott summed up the case for regulation:
It is very easy to accept that careful regulation is essential to ensure that so far as
possible professional boxers are protected against abuse, whether from unfair contracts
with managers or promoters, or from being overmatched in overambitious promotions,
or from boxing when physically unfit, or indeed from their own naivete. The need for
careful regulation of professional boxing is underlined by the very substantial sums of
money that depend upon the outcome of some fights and by the association of gam-
bling with the sport.
Watson, 1993 E.M.L.R. at 282.




three year extension. This point was dwarfed, however, by the judge's
view of the conflict of interest problem.""
As Watson's manager, Duff was obliged to negotiate with promoters
on his behalf and obtain the most advantageous terms possible (for Wat-
son). It would be very difficult for Duff the manager to negotiate realis-
tically with Duff the promoter; the greater the amount paid to the boxer
the less was left for the promoter.8 9 Accordingly, the agreement was
held to be contrary to public policy and consequently unenforceablef 0
V. OFF THE RoPEs: THE FuTuRE OF B=rISH BOXING
The response of the BBBC to Watson was to tighten the arrange-
ments for extending the contract after the winning of a championship
belt. This had been the subject of major judicial criticism in Watson and
the current provision is contained within Clause 12:
If during the Initial Period:
(i) The Boxer wins a British Championship or European, Com-
monwealth or World Championship organised by a controlling
body to which the Board is affiliated; and
(ii) At that time the initial period has less than two years to run
the Manager may serve a written notice ("an Extension Notice)
extending the duration of this Agreement. Any such extension
shall expire not later than 18 months after the date on which the
Boxer wins the relevant Championship.
The standard contract immediately prior to the current one had provided
for an extension period of two years,91 so it can be seen that the Board is
taking positive steps to ensure that the agreement is within acceptable
judicial bounds.
Similarly, the Board has given serious consideration to the conflicts
of interest problem and has addressed this through a modified Clause 6;
now in the event of a manager promoting his boxer, he must complete a
Form 36A which directly informs the boxer of the arrangement. 9 Fur-
ther, the form must be signed by the boxer, thus drawing the matter
explicitly to his attention. This provision extends to situations in which
the manager has "any financial or other association with the intended
88. See id. at 301.
89. Id. at 302.
90. Id. at 302-03.
91. 1994 Standard Boxer/Manager Agreement § 12.1. 1994 Standard Boxer/Manager
Agreement kindly supplied by BBBC.
92. 1995 Standard Boxer/Manager Agreement § 12.1. 1995 Standard Boxer/Manager
Agreement kindly supplied by BBBC.
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Promoter.""3 Clearly this is designed to catch indirect conflicts of inter-
est that were revealed in Watson. The manager may not proceed with
the promotion until the boxer is satisfied with the terms, which have to
be provided in writing and fully explained by the manager.94 Clause 6
also specifically deals with the issue of television rights, as now the man-
ager cannot arrange an inclusive purse unless the boxer is specifically
informed. In the event of the manager breaching this clause, he is liable
to pay the boxer the amount stipulated by the standard promoter/boxer
agreement (a percentage of the television fee).95
These are serious attempts to deal with the problems raised by both
the Warren and Watson cases and to produce a contract that will with-
stand legal challenge.96 The BBBC has gone a stage further and at-
tempted to reduce the likelihood of litigation. An arbitration clause had
long been a part of the standard agreement,97 although in Watson, where
the whole contract was deemed to be unenforceable, the arbitration
clause also was deemed invalid. The current agreement now has, as part
of the manager's obligations, a clause that allows the boxer to refer the
matter to the Board: "If the Boxer is not satisfied with the number or
quality of Boxing or other engagements arranged by, or opponents se-
lected by, the Manager."9
The Board has given itself the authority in such circumstances to "de-
cide whether the Boxer shall be released from this agreement." 99 This is
93. Id. § 6.1(ii).
94. Id. § 6.2.
95. Id. § 6.3(ii).
96. The application of the doctrine of restraint of trade within the entertainment industry
is unaffected by the recent High Court decision of Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment
Ltd., 1994 E.M.L.R. 229 (the George Michael case) as although the first decision went in favor
of Sony (and against the recent trend), the dispute has now been settled and will consequently
not be heard by the Court of Appeal.
97. The Arbitration clause reads as follows:
Disputes. In the event of any disputes in respect of any matter arising under, out of or
pursuant to this Agreement, the parties shall refer such dispute for arbitration by way
of a complaint to the applicable BBB of C Area Council or the Board in accordance
with the provisions of the BBB of C Regulation 15a entitled 'Complaints', and such
arbitration shall be subject to the provisions of the BBB of C Regulation 16 entitled
'Appeal'. The procedures contained in the said Regulations shall be exhausted and an
order, decision or award made in accordance with the said Regulations by the aforesaid
Area Council or Board, or, in the case of an appeal, by the BBB of C Stewards of
Appeal, before any application may be made to the Courts of Law by any of the parties
hereto.
Watson, 1993 E.M.L.R. at 279.




a clear indication that the Board views the two cases and perhaps the
general trend in the field of entertainment very seriously. Litigation is
after all very damaging as it freezes the very product that generates the
income (the boxer) for the length of the dispute. Given the limited dura-
tion of a boxing career, it is sensible to try to avoid litigation for all
parties. At the same time as the Board has been attempting to produce
a more realistic agreement, the boxers themselves have taken steps to
protect their position.
VI. THE BOXERS' REACTION
One of the most significant developments in British professional box-
ing has been the formation in February 1993 of the Professional Boxers
Association (PBA). °0° Unlike other major spectator sports in Britain
such as football, 10 1 golf,10 2 and cricket,0 3 a body designed to cater to the
needs of professional boxers did not previously exist. The PBA has as its
objectives the following:
i) To promote and protect the interests of members and former
members.
ii) To protect the rights including contractual and (where appli-
cable) employment rights of members connected with profes-
sional boxing.
iii) To provide assistance, including legal assistance, where the
PBA in its absolute discretion deems appropriate in any matter
100. "The PBA is a members organisation. The members pay an annual subscription of
£25. We are actively seeking commercial partners who, through sponsorship, can help us raise
the financial resources that are required if we are to fulfill our objectives." PBA Leaflet
(1995). See also Jabs for Life, IKON, Sept. 1995, at 24.
101. The Professional Footballers Association ("PFA") was founded in 1907 and now
numbers almost 4,000 professional footballers as members. It has recently affiliated to the
Trades Union Congress ("TUC"). Gordon Taylor, Chief Executive of the PFA commented:
"We are very pleased to accept the invitation to join the TUC and to play our part along with
other trade unions and associations to meet the demands of modem day technology and in-
dustrial relations." TUC Press Release (July 28, 1995) (on file with author).
102. The Professional Golfers' Association was founded in 1901 "to promote interest in
the game of golf; to protect and advance the mutual trade interests of its members; to arrange
and hold meetings and tournaments periodically for the members; to institute and operate
funds for the benefit of the members; to assist the members to obtain employment; and effect
any other objects of a like nature as may be determined from time to time by the Associa-
tion." THE ROYAL & ANCIENT GOLFER'S HANDBOOK 779 (Michael Williams ed., 1994).
103. The Professional Cricketers' Association ("PCA") was formed in 1967 to protect
cricketers' interests. It now boasts a 100% membership. See Guy Osborn & Steve Greenfield,
Gentlemen, Players and the 6'9" West Indian Fast Bowler: the Changing Character(s) of Eng-
lish Cricket, in MANCHESTER METROPOLITAN UNIVERSrrY WORKING PAPERS IN LAW AND
POPULAR CULTURE (Series 2, No. 3).
1995]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
arising out of a member's or former members involvement in pro-
fessional boxing.
iv) To establish and/or administer funds for the benefit of mem-
bers and former members or for such other purposes as the PBA
in its absolute discretion deems appropriate. 1°4
While there had been a perceived recognition that boxers needed pro-
tection in a medical sense, 05 the formation of the PBA was a reaction to
wider concerns of a fiscal nature. The PBA also could act efficiently on
behalf of the individual boxers within the machinery of professional
boxing.
The PBA's proactive role in attempting to act as a unified body rep-
resenting the boxers interests can be seen in tandem with the setting up
of a BBBC sub-committee which is liaising with managers and boxers to
see how the existing standard form contract can be improved in the light
of the judgements in Warren and Watson. Certainly the standard form
contracts are considered a priority by the PBA: "The most important
aspect we have focused on so far must be the changes we are proposing
to the boxer/manager agreement. We are working closely with the
BBBC on this."' 06
The setting up of such a committee can be seen within the context of
other movements within the entertainment industry. Part of the problem
is that standard depersonalized contracts are being used to bind what are
skilled "artists." Certainly the recent British case involving George
Michael'0 7 was one based upon the treatment of a creative superstar as
merely a commodity that can be seemingly bought, sold, or traded at
will: "The core of Michael's case is that Sony treats him as 'little more
than software' to be plugged into the company's hardware."'0 8
While there are still inherent problems in the relationships between
boxers, promoters and managers, there are signs that the contractual po-
sition of the boxer is improving through a combination of litigation and
self preservation. Sport in general is increasingly developing into a sub-
104. BRITISH BOARD OF BOXING CONTROL YEARBOOK 17 (Barry Hugman ed., 1994)
[hereinafter BBBC YEARBOOK].
105. See Gunn & Ormerod, supra note 2.
106. BBBC YEARBOOK, supra note 104, at 18. This quote is attributed to Colin McMil-
lan, PBA Secretary and former WBO feather weight champion.
107. The case has recently been settled with Michael moving to Dreamworks SKG (a new
company set up by Spielberg, former Disney chairman Jeffrey Katzenberg, and record tycoon
David Geffen) for North America with Virgin Music handling his releases in the rest of the
world. See The Battle for George Michael, Tim INDEPENDENT WEEKEND, July 15, 1995, at 5.
108. Matthew Lynn & Rufus Olins, Music Giants Tremble as George Battles Sony, THE
SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 17, 1993.
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genre of show business, mainly through the influence of television,10 9
and boxing is no exception: "With two big names on the bill, a televised
fight is choreographed to take advantage of every crowd pleasing
opportunity." 1 0
Accordingly, the status of "star" boxers is changing. As in other ar-
eas of entertainment, boxers are showing an increasing willingness to
protect their hard fought interests. The fact that the boxer's career is
necessarily a short one (except perhaps in cases such as George Fore-
man) and also inherently dangerous lends credence to the notion that
the economic and social well being of boxers should be carefully dealt
with:
The relationship between the creative artist (be it in the field of
sport, film or music) and the public is worthy of nurture and pro-
tection. The public interest notion in the doctrine of restraint of
trade needs to be considered in the light of this relationship and
artists must be granted more freedom and control not less."'
The recent British Boxing experience suggests that the doctrine of
restraint of trade has had a positive effect on the party's contractual rela-
tionships and it is to be hoped that such progression can be built upon to
protect an initially vulnerable group of entertainers. Certainly, the signs
are that British boxers are beginning to be treated less like a "piece of
steak" that can be bought, sold, and traded and given more protection
commensurate of the risks they are taking and the potential rewards that
can be earned." 2
109. See generally GARY R. WHANNEL, FIELDS IN VISION: TELEVISION, SPORT AND CUL-
TURAL TRANSFORMATION (1992) (offering a perceptive insight into the reshaping of sport via
television coverage).
110. Hannah Bryan, The Magnificent Barbarism, THE OBSERVER, July 31, 1994, at 9.
111. Greenfield & Osborn, supra note 27, at 126.
112. See London, supra note 1. The commodification of artists is receiving much critical
academic coverage; with regard to musicians, see Greenfield & Osborn, supra note 27; with
regard to football, see STEVE GREENFIELD & Guy OSBORN, THE ABSOLUTE GAME. COM-
MODIFICATION AND COMMERCIALISATION IN FOOTBALL (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on
file with author).
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